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Whilst the continuity hypothesis of dreaming seems to be 
receiving empirical and theoretical support within the dream 
research community, there is agreement that the definition 
and measurement of continuity is in its youth (Hobson & 
Schredl, 2011).
The continuity hypothesis, most broadly defined, involves 
some overlap between dreaming and waking (Schredl & 
Hofmann, 2003). This can occur at a behavioural level (fea-
turing the incorporation of waking experiences into dreams), 
a cognitive level (concerning continuity of dream recall 
styles, memory activity etc), individual differences (per-
sonality, gender being continuous across dream and wake 
realms), and/or neurochemical (demonstrating continuity 
between particular sleep and waking states). Research into 
the latter has demonstrated differences as well as similari-
ties in the activity of brain regions across sleep and wake, 
which have largely been interpreted as being physiologically 
discontinuous, and therefore a reflection of discontinuity on 
an experiential level, also. However continuity rather than 
discontinuity has been emphasised in terms of dream-wake 
content, behaviours and cognitive styles (see Kahan & La-
Berge, 2010). It is therefore necessary to achieve two things: 
firstly to select carefully the states in which we are com-
paring physiological, behavioural, or other activity. As the 
waking brain is as variant and changeable as the sleeping 
brain over the time-course of the night, so diligent sampling 
of experiences is essential. Secondly, there is a real need to 
operationalise continuity and discontinuity, to ensure parity 
in the use, measurement and understanding of these terms. 
We shall focus upon one particular element of continuity: 
that of the incorporation of particular waking experiences 
into dreams. This may be conceived of as the continuity 
of memory activity across sleep and wake.  Such experi-
ences may be “lived” whilst awake, and re-experienced in 
the sleeping mind. However those experiences may also be 
ruminated upon, or thought and talked about in waking, as 
well as in the dream-world. Occasionally, experiences may 
be brought to mind within a dream, and experienced as 
a memory, rather than seemingly being “lived” out in the 
dream. So the continuity of memory activity is complex and 
bi-directional: dreams may be incorporated into our waking 
mentation, through either voluntary or involuntary autobio-
graphical memory retrieval processes, and waking experi-
ences may be incorporated into dreams. The former has 
been investigated in studies of dream recall, but could also 
be considered an important aspect of continuity. Further, 
some experiences from waking may be incorporated into 
dreams, ruminated upon in wake, and further incorporated 
into dreams. Thus the continuity between dreaming and 
waking may be cyclical as well as bi-directional. 
Some systematic investigations have attempted to 
characterise what kinds of waking experiences feature in 
dreams sampled from different stages of sleep. According 
to Baylor and Cavallero (2001), REM dreams are less likely 
than non-REM dreams to contain episodic memories, which 
are unique experiences, specific in place and time (Conway, 
2001; Tulving, 1983). Concurrently, non-REM sleep seems 
to selectively consolidate, or enhance retrieval for, episodic 
memories (Rauchs et al., 2004). Thus it could be argued 
that the memories activated in the sleeping brain, mani-
fested in our dreams, reflect underlying processes of mem-
ory consolidation. REM dreams are more likely to contain 
self-representation (Baylor & Cavallero, 2001; Foulkes and 
Schmidt, 1983), and REM dreams are more elaborate and 
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include a broader range of mnemonic origins, including epi-
sodic memories, general knowledge, and self-knowledge 
generally (Foulkes, Bradley, Cavallero, & Hollifield, 1989), 
likely because they are more recallable. In fact when Caval-
lero, Foulkes, Hollifield and Terry (1990) controlled for the 
length of dreams, differences between the memory sources 
of REM versus non-REM dreams disappeared. Thus any in-
vestigation of a potential link between memory sources of 
dreams and the consolidation of those memories, needs to 
sample both dreams and the memory sources therein most 
carefully, to overcome such methodological issues of recall 
bias. 
In contrast to Baylor and Cavellero’s (2001) findings, there 
seems to be a growing consensus that truly episodic mem-
ory sources are not a feature of dreams (Fosse, Fosse, Hob-
son & Stickgold, 2003; Malinowski & Horton, 2011b). This 
led Fosse et al. to assume a functional dissociation between 
dreaming and episodic memory. As previously described, 
memories are occasionally able to be experienced as mem-
ories within the dreaming brain, thus a conclusion of an en-
tire inability for episodic memories to be relived is perhaps 
overly simplistic. Rather, the relationship between dreaming 
and memory activation is complex. We propose that auto-
biographical memory activation is a key feature of dreaming 
(Horton, in prep., Horton, 2011a & b; Horton & Malinowski, 
2011; Malinowski & Horton, 2011a). Autobiographical mem-
ory (Conway, 2001; 2005) involves the reconstruction of per-
sonal experiences and information about the self. That is, 
fragments of experience can be retrieved, with or without 
the associated context of that experience. In dreams, it is 
not unlikely to find our current self in a location (context) 
familiar from childhood, conversing with someone who ap-
peared within a film we watched the previous night.  In such 
a dream, fragments of autobiographical experience are re-
activated and re-bound into a seemingly bizarre experience. 
This may reflect both elements of continuity and discontinu-
ity. It is important to note that despite the fragmentary and 
bizarre nature of autobiographical incorporation into dreams, 
such discontinuity may well be functional, insofar as reflect-
ing the underlying processes of memory consolidation with-
in the sleeping brain. Hartmann (1996; 2011) proposes that 
the autoassociative state of the dreaming brain functions to 
allow experiences from our waking lives to be played out 
in a safe environment, in dreams. Thus seemingly bizarre 
connections between elements from waking life are bound 
together in dreams, in a functional manner – according to 
Hartmann in terms of learning about and rehearsing experi-
ences. We extend this idea by suggesting that this function 
also serves a purpose for memory and learning. Thus we 
must continue to investigate and understand dream discon-
tinuity as well as continuity, and not assume that discontinu-
ity reflects randomness or non-functionality.
Discontinuity can assumedly be defined in a similar way 
to continuity, as taking several possible forms: behavioural; 
cognitive; individual differences, neurochemical etc. Dis-
cussions of dream bizarreness have highlighted some dis-
continuities within dreaming cognition (Hobson, Hoffman, 
Helfman & Kostner, 1987) and across dream and wake 
(Revonsuo & Salmivalli, 1995). Malinowski & Horton (this is-
sue) discuss how bizarreness and discontinuity seem to be 
independent characteristics of dreaming, thus discontinuity 
does not necessarily involve bizarreness. 
If continuity, and discontinuity when appropriately de-
fined, may reflect the underlying mechanisms of memory 
consolidation in sleep, explicit links between the incorpo-
ration of waking autobiographical experiences into dreams 
and subsequent consolidation must be made. Studies 
have begun to highlight these links between dreaming and 
consolidation (Horton, in prep.; Walmsley, Tucker, Payne, 
Benavides & Stickgold, 2010) and this development is most 
welcome. Further, with waking experiences being re-acti-
vated in the sleeping brain (thus appearing as fragments of 
experience within a dream) in a different context to that in 
which it was experienced in wake, it is not surprising that 
episodic memories do not appear to be incorporated into 
dreams. The function of this could be to allow specific frag-
ments of waking experiences to be selectively reproduced, 
perhaps played out in a novel or bizarre context, rendering 
them context-free and subsequently increasing their inter-
relations with other associated memory fragments (Hart-
mann, 1996; 2011). This may well render those fragments 
of autobiographical knowledge more retrievable at a later 
date, thus contributing to the consolidation process. Thus 
the discontinuity as well as the continuity again hint at a po-
tential function of the interplay between dreams and wake 
– that of improving the recallability of important information.
The next step in this research exploit is to determine the 
means by which waking experiences are selectively incor-
porated into dreams. Preliminary work demonstrates that 
emotionality, but not necessarily stressfulness, mediate 
such processes (Horton, Smith & Proctor, 2011; Malinowski 
& Horton, 2011a). Further, there may be differences in the 
way that novel experiences are incorporated into dreams, 
compared to previously acquired knowledge or experiences 
(Domhoff, 2005). The time-course of incorporation of these 
distinct types of experiences, along with an understanding 
of the neuroscience and cognitive mechanisms of consoli-
dation, can be most promising in furthering our appreciation 
of dream-wake continuity.
This brief commentary has emphasised the need to define 
and operationalise continuity as well as discontinuity, and 
then to identify the extent to which continuity may reflect 
memory consolidation processes within the sleeping brain. 
Concurrently, researchers need to identify whether dream-
ing is an integral part of the consolidation process. Even if 
the experience of dreaming is not found to be an essential 
part of the process, it certainly serves a fantastic method-
ological function of providing a window onto the processes 
of consolidation, via continuity and discontinuity.
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